

HTML5

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Where are we going?

HTML5

WebSockets

AngularJS

HTML5 Sinks



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WebSockets:

Full duplex communications between client or server to a resource.

A secure version of the WebSocket protocol is implemented in Firefox 6,

Safari 6,

Google Chrome 14,

Opera 12.10

Internet Explorer 10.



Request:

GET /chat HTTP/1.1

Host: server.example.com

Upgrade: websocket

Connection: Upgrade

Sec-WebSocket-Key: x3JJHMBDL1EzLkh9GBhXDw==

Sec-WebSocket-Protocol: chat, superchat

Sec-WebSocket-Version: 13

Origin: <http://example.com>

This helps ensure that the server does not accept connections from non-WebSocket clients – Abuse?

Response:

HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols

Upgrade: websocket

Connection: Upgrade

Sec-WebSocket-Accept: HSmrc0sMIYUkAGmm5OPpG2HaGWk=

Sec-WebSocket-Protocol: chat

It is the web server's responsibility to verify the *Origin* header in the initial HTTP WebSocket handshake. If the Origin header is not properly checked, the application may be vulnerable to CSRF

Sec-WebSocket-Key header field in the client's handshake were " x3JJHMBDL1EzLkh9GBhXDw== ", the server would append the string "258EAF5E-E914-47DA-95CA-C5AB0DC85B11" to form the string " x3JJHMBDL1EzLkh9GBhXDw== 258EAF5E-E914-47DA-95CA- C5AB0DC85B11". The server would then take the SHA-1 hash of this and return the value.



WebSockets

```
if(window.WebSocket) {  
  
    /*browser has websocket support  
    var sock = new WebSocket('ws://server:8181');  
    ....  
    sock.onopen = function(event) {  
        /*Open... sock.send() */  
    }  
  
    sock.onmessage = function(e) {  
        /*Received message */  
        e.data();...  
    }  
  
    sock.onclose = function(event) { /* Connection closed  
    }  
}
```



ProTip

- You should use the secure `wss://` protocol over the insecure `ws://` transport.
- Never Tunnel via websockets from the browser to say a database! XSS attacks can attack such connections.
- CSRF and WebSockets
- Process the messages received by the websocket as **data**.
 - Never try to assign it directly to the DOM nor evaluate as code.
 - If the response is JSON, **never** use the insecure `eval()` function; use the safe option `JSON.parse()` instead.



Websockets Authentication

Authentication

WebSockets do not handle authentication, instead normal application authentication mechanisms apply, such as cookies, HTTP Authentication or TLS authentication.

Input Validation

As with any data originating from untrusted sources the data should not be trusted.



Websockets Authentication

- Check the Origin: header in the Websockets handshake. Though it might be spoofed outside a browser, browsers always add the Origin of the page that initiated the Websockets connection.
- Always validate data coming through a WebSockets connection.



AngularJS Pitfalls

AngularJS uses stuff like:

`{{}}` are expressions in AngularJS. They are parsed and executed

`{{5+5}}` <- output is 10

`<div ng-init="some.js.code.here">`

or

`{{constructor.constructor('alert(1)')()}}`

AngularJS uses it's own parser; If there's an injection source, no actual antiXSS filter will be able to stop these attacks.



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HTML5 Sinks

Formaction:

```
<form id="test"></form><button form="test"  
formaction="javascript:alert(1)">X</button>
```

```
<form><button formaction="javascript:alert(1)">clickme</button>
```

- Don't allow users to submit markup containing "form" and "formaction" attributes or transform them to bogus attributes.

HTML Attribute encoding of user data should prevent injection of formaction



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More HTML 5 Elements

<video>:

```
<video vid1=javascript:alert(1)//></video>
```

```
<video><src onerror="alert(1)">
```

Oninput:

```
<body oninput=alert(1)><input autofocus>
```

Srcdoc:

```
<html><body><iframe src=""  
srcdoc=<script>alert(123)</script></body>
```



More HTML 5 elements

HTML5 offers the <picture> element.

"srcset" attribute allows to trigger load events:

```
<picture><img srcset="x" onerror="alert(1)"></picture>
```



Other elements which need to be considered

<TABLE>	<FRAMESET>	<BASE>	<OBJECT>	<EMBED>
<TITLE>	[if] (conditional comments)	<LINK>	<STYLE> @import data	

Local Storage

- Also known as “WebStorage” , “DOM Storage”

- Supported by:

HTML5 Storage support

IE	Firefox	Safari	Chrome	Opera	iPhone	Android
8.0+	3.5+	4.0+	4.0+	10.5+	2.0+	2.0+

- Accessed via “LocalStorage” object:

```
var foo = localStorage.getItem("bar"); localStorage.setItem("bar",  
foo);
```



Local Storage

- it's recommended not to store any sensitive information in local storage.
 - Malware;
 - Unencrypted storage on local machine
 - Shared computer environment etc etc
- *sessionStorage* instead of *localStorage* should be considered if persistent storage is not needed.
 - *sessionStorage* object is available only to that window/tab until the window is closed.



Local Storage

- XSS can steal data similar to session cookie attacks.
- XSS can also load malicious data into local storage.
- getItem() and setItem() calls in Javascript are sources and sinks for localstorage attacks.
- Multiple applications on the **Same Origin** would share the same localstorage...beware. One vulnerability could result in many applications being attacked!!!



iFrame Sandboxing

Sandboxed frames

- Use the sandbox attribute of an iframe for untrusted content. Rendering content based in input from an untrusted source.
- The sandbox attribute of an iframe enables restrictions on content within a iframe.
- The following restrictions are active when the sandbox attribute is set:
 - All markup is treated as being from a unique origin.
 - All forms and scripts are disabled.
 - All links are prevented from targeting other browsing contexts.
 - All features that triggers automatically are blocked.
 - All plugins are disabled.



iFrame Sandboxing

```
<iframe src="demo_iframe_sandbox.htm"  
sandbox="<VALUE>"></iframe>
```

- If <VALUE> is specified as an empty string (sandbox=""), the sandbox attribute enables a set of extra restrictions for the content in the inline frame.
- The value of the sandbox attribute can either be an empty string (all the restrictions is applied), or a space-separated list of pre-defined values that will REMOVE particular restrictions.



iFrame Sandboxing

```
<iframe src="demo_iframe_sandbox.htm"  
sandbox="<VALUE>"></iframe>
```

Value	Description
"" (empty)	Applies all restrictions below
allow-same-origin	Allows the iframe content to be treated as being from the same origin as the containing document
allow-top-navigation	Allows the iframe content to navigate (load) content from the containing document
allow-forms	Allows form submission
allow-scripts	Allows script execution



iFrame Sandboxing

- In old versions of user agents where this feature is not supported, this attribute will be ignored. - backward compatible
- iFrame Sandboxing can be used as an additional layer of protection.
- It may be an option to check if the browser supports sandboxed frames and only show the untrusted content if supported.
- Apart from this attribute, to prevent Clickjacking attacks and unsolicited framing it is encouraged to use the header X-Frame-Options which supports the deny and same-origin values.

